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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Judicial opinions analyzing civil procedure issues are unlikely sources 
of rich imagery. Recent legal scholarship on metaphor has focused on 
sexier areas of the law, such as constitutional interpretation1 or the 
                                                                                                                     
 ∗ Professor of Law, University of South Carolina. The author would like to thank Professor 
Ben Means of the University of South Carolina for his extremely helpful comments on an early 
draft of this Article. 
 1. See, e.g., STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST 266–73 (2001) (analyzing the 
roots and implications of Oliver Wendell Holmes’s “marketplace of ideas” metaphor in First 
Amendment jurisprudence); see generally, e.g., Scott Dodson, A Darwinist View of the Living 
Constitution, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1319 (2008) (exploring the metaphor of a living Constitution and 
its implications from a biological perspective); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as 
Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998) (promoting the 
metaphor of a market for partisan control as a useful tool with which to analyze Constitutional 
boundaries of state regulation of democratic politics); Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property Metaphors 
and Kelo v. New London: Two Views of the Castle, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2971 (2006) (critiquing 
the home-as-castle metaphor as a force galvanizing public opposition to the Supreme Court’s 2005 
takings clause decision); Robert L. Tsai, Fire, Metaphor, and Constitutional Myth-Making, 93 GEO. 
L.J. 181 (2004) (analyzing the Supreme Court’s use of fire as a metaphor and motif in its free 
expression decisions). 
1
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regulation of new technologies.2 Nevertheless, beneath the superficially 
arid terrain of civil procedure opinions run streams of metaphor that reveal 
anxieties, fears, and resentments regarding the litigation process and that 
propagate a specific characterization of that process. These metaphors may 
be so subtle as to go unnoticed. 
This Article notices and examines the metaphoric content and the 
frame-shifting technique of a far-reaching procedural opinion from the 
Supreme Court’s most recent term, Ashcroft v. Iqbal.3 That case, which 
builds upon the Court’s 2007 decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,4 
has increased the required specificity with which plaintiffs must plead their 
cases in order to avoid early dismissal. Both cases increased this 
requirement by subjecting the factual allegations of a complaint to a new 
and amorphous “plausibility” standard.5 While these rather technical cases 
drew little media attention, they have profoundly affected arguments 
regarding access to justice in civil cases.6 Both decisions, but especially 
Iqbal, place plaintiffs in a Catch-22. In order to enter the discovery phase 
of the litigation process, where litigants may use the power of the court to 
gain access to evidence in an opponent’s possession, plaintiffs must now 
state their claims in more factual detail than before. Often, however, 
plaintiffs cannot allege detailed facts until they gain access to detailed 
evidence through the discovery process. 
Other scholarship has wrestled with the substantive implications of 
these recent decisions.7 This Article focuses instead on how the current 
                                                                                                                     
 2. See generally, e.g., Robert C. Cumbow, Cyberspace Must Exceed Its Grasp, or What’s a 
Metaphor? Tropes, Trips and Stumbles on the Info Highway, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 665 (1997) 
(analyzing judicial use of metaphors in decisions concerning applicability of copyright doctrine to 
internet content); Stephanie A. Gore, “A Rose by Any Other Name”: Judicial Use of Metaphors for 
New Technologies, 2003 J.L. TECH. &  POL’Y 403 (criticizing judicial use of inapposite metaphors in 
technology cases and suggesting more appropriate metaphors).  
 3. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
 4. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 5. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (noting that complaint must contain “plausible grounds” to 
allow court to infer elements of plaintiff’s claim); Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951 (“We next consider the 
factual allegations in respondent’s complaint to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to 
relief.”). 
 6. A Westlaw search conducted on April 2, 2010, indicated that Twombly had been cited in 
over 26,000 subsequent judicial opinions and that Iqbal had been cited in over 7,100 opinions. 
 7. See generally, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A 
Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849 (2010) [hereinafter Bone, Plausibility 
Pleading Revisited] (criticizing Iqbal as an ill-advised expansion of Twombly); Robert G. Bone, 
Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873 (2009) 
[hereinafter Bone, Regulation of Court Access] (evaluating the costs and benefits of screening 
meritless suits at the pleading stage); Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of Modern 
American Procedure, 93 JUDICATURE 109 (2009) (critiquing Twombly and Iqbal); Scott Dodson, 
Essay, Pleading Standards After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 135 
(2007) (analyzing the implications of Twombly); A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 
B.C. L. REV. 431 (2008) (critiquing Twombly); Saritha Komatireddy Tice, A “Plausible” 
Explanation of Pleading Standards: Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007), 31 
HARV. J.L. &  PUB. POL’Y, 827, 830 (2008) (discussing the significance of Twombly). For a review 
2
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Court has used frame-shifting and metaphor to achieve such sweeping 
change with so little apparent effort. Through a close reading of Iqbal, I 
identify two crucial moves. First, through its use of the word “entitlement” 
and related terms, the Court adopts a new frame of reference by 
emphasizing the plaintiff’s lack of entitlement to proceed to discovery, 
rather than the defendant’s lack of entitlement to receive detailed 
allegations at the pleading stage. Second, by drawing on a metaphor of 
judging-as-measuring, the Court invests its new plausibility test with the 
appearance of objective consistency, and in so doing, deflects attention 
from the unbounded discretion that the opinion grants to judges who will 
administer that test from now on in the lower courts. 
Part II of this Article places Iqbal in its historical doctrinal context by 
describing the change to federal pleading standards brought about by the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 and the Supreme Court’s recent 
tightening of those standards. Part III then critiques Iqbal’s pleadings 
analysis through a close reading of the majority opinion in the case, 
focusing on the Court’s frame-shifting use of the word “entitlement” and 
on the judging-as-weighing metaphor used by the majority to justify its 
application of the plausibility test. Part IV draws briefly upon recent 
research in cognitive psychology and on theories of metaphor to explain 
both the power of frame-shifting and metaphorical techniques and also the 
necessity of identifying and critiquing their use in judicial opinions. 
II.   PLEADING REQUIREMENTS BEFORE AND AFTER IQBAL 
A.  Pleading Standards from the Advent of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure to 2007 
The most recent large-scale reform in federal pleading occurred in 
1938, when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became effective. Charles 
E. Clark, the chief architect of the Federal Rules, intended to simplify and 
streamline the pleading process by re-emphasizing the notice-giving 
function of pleadings and by doing away with the perceived necessity of 
pleading detailed facts.8 Indeed, the system established by Rule 8(a)(2) has 
                                                                                                                     
of scholarly commentary on Twombly, see Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn Up the Chaff with 
Unquenchable Fire: What Two Doctrinal Intersections Can Teach Us About Judicial Power Over 
Pleadings, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1217, 1234–38 (2008). 
 8. Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U. L.Q. 297, 316 (1938) 
(explaining that under the Federal Rules, pleadings serve primarily the modest function of stating 
allegations sufficient to “isolate [the action] from all others, so that the parties and the court will 
know what is the matter in dispute,” rather than describing parties’ evidence in detail). The code 
pleading system, in effect before the promulgation of the Federal Rules, had required the pleading 
of “facts.” See CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 150 (1928). While 
this system did not explicitly require detailed factual allegations, some courts required a relatively 
high level of technical detail, and litigants risked having pleadings dismissed if courts considered 
their assertions to be general legal conclusions rather than specific factual allegations. See id. at 
150–55 (describing the difficulty, under code pleading, of distinguishing among factual, 
evidentiary, and legal assertions and noting specific instances of pleadings dismissed as asserting 
3
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come to be known—for better or worse—as “notice pleading.”9 The 
Federal Rules pleading system allows courts to screen out legally 
insufficient claims at the pleading stage, but it leaves screening based on 
the factual merits to the discovery phase through summary judgment. Thus, 
Rule 8(a)(2) requires merely that a pleading set forth “a short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”10 The 
Rule 8(a)(2) standard represents a policy choice to minimize the risk that 
meritorious cases will be prematurely dismissed at the pleading stage—a 
stage at which plaintiffs may lack access to detailed evidence.11 This 
policy, of course, carries some cost. Specifically, a low threshold for 
stating a claim in the pleadings means that more cases will proceed to the 
often costly and lengthy discovery phase. Some actions making it to the 
discovery phase will turn out to be non-meritorious based on the evidence, 
but even if such actions are disposed of through summary judgment, 
defending parties will already have invested significant time, money, and 
energy litigating to that point. 
In 1957, the Supreme Court in Conley v. Gibson12 explicitly interpreted 
Rule 8(a)(2) in terms of this low notice-pleading threshold. Justice Hugo 
Black’s opinion noted that “the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not 
require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his 
claim” but instead require only that a complaint give “the defendant fair 
notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it 
rests.”13 In an earlier paragraph, the opinion had used the following 
language to begin its analysis of whether the complaint at issue had stated a 
claim: 
In appraising the sufficiency of the complaint we follow, of 
course, the accepted rule that a complaint should not be 
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond 
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of 
                                                                                                                     
merely general legal conclusions); JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE &  ARTHUR R. MILLER, 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 252–53 (4th ed. 2005) (summarizing the spread of code-pleading systems and 
their replacement, in the federal courts and most state courts, with Rules-based systems requiring 
less detail in pleadings); 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &  ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 1202 (3d ed. 2004) (“Federal civil pleadings differ from the ‘fact pleading’ of the 
codes principally in the degree of generality with which the elements of the claim may be stated.”).  
 9. WRIGHT &  MILLER, supra note 8, at § 1202 (noting that the label may exaggerate the 
generality allowed by Rule 8 but conceding that it is too late to remove the term from common 
parlance). 
 10. FED. R. CIV . P. 8(a)(2). 
 11. See RICHARD D. FREER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 302 (2d ed. 2009) (explaining that the Rules 
drafters intended to “lower the formal barrier . . . to entering the litigation stream” because “the 
plaintiff is not in a position to plead much detail at the outset of litigation”); CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT &  MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 477 (6th ed. 2002) (noting that the 
“fundamental notion of all modern procedural reform” is that the object of procedure is to secure 
“determination on the merits rather than to penalize litigants because of procedural blunders”). 
 12. 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
 13. Id. at 47. 
4
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his claim which would entitle him to relief. Here, the 
complaint alleged, in part, that petitioners were discharged 
wrongfully by the Railroad and that the Union, acting 
according to plan, refused to protect their jobs as it did those 
of white employees or to help them with their grievances all 
because they were Negroes. If these allegations are proven[,] 
there has been a manifest breach of the Union’s statutory duty 
to represent fairly and without hostile discrimination all of the 
employees in the bargaining unit.14 
If taken literally, the first sentence above, with its reference to “no set of 
facts,” would mean that a complaint that alleges only the plaintiff’s and 
defendant’s names should not be dismissed as insufficient, because it does 
not negate the possibility that the plaintiff could prove some set of 
unmentioned facts that would legally entitle him or her to relief from the 
defendant.15 Naturally, the lower courts did not adopt such a literal 
interpretation.16 A more reasonable reading of this language takes into 
account its context, including the description of the allegations at issue in 
Conley and Justice Black’s later reference to the need to give fair notice to 
the defendant of the claim and grounds. Presumably, the “no set of facts” 
assertion was intended to mean that if a complaint contains sufficient 
allegations to provide fair notice of the conduct and harm at issue, for 
which the law provides a remedy, and if the complaint contains no 
allegations that would negate an element of the claim as a matter of law, 
then a court must hold that the complaint has stated a legally sufficient 
claim for purposes of Rule 8(a)(2). 
While the “no set of facts” language was not a model of clarity, the 
general consensus in the fifty years following Conley was that if a 
complaint gave fair notice of the events giving rise to a cognizable claim, it 
met the Rule 8(a)(2) standard, and that fair notice did not require 
particularity and detail.17 The authoritative Wright and Miller treatise, in 
2004, summed up the standard as follows:  
The rule requires the pleader to disclose adequate information 
regarding the basis of his claim for relief as distinguished 
                                                                                                                     
 14. Id. at 45–46 (footnote omitted). 
 15. Indeed, as Professor Richard Marcus has noted, “How can a court ever be certain that a 
plaintiff will prove no set of facts entitling him to relief?” Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact 
Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 434 (1986) 
(emphasis added). 
 16. See Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Cos., 727 F.2d 648, 654 (7th Cir. 1984) (“Although the 
exceedingly forgiving attitude toward pleading deficiencies that was expressed by Justice Black for 
the Supreme Court in Conley v. Gibson . . . continues to be quoted with approval[,]  . . .  it has 
never been taken literally.”) (citation omitted). 
 17. See, e.g., FRIEDENTHAL, KANE &  MILLER, supra note 8, at 268 (“What the pleader need 
not do is allege a specific fact to cover every element or identify the theory of recovery. As long as 
the opposing party and the court can obtain a basic understanding of the claim being made, the 
requirements are satisfied.”) (footnotes omitted). 
5
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from a bare averment that he wants relief and is entitled to it. 
Undoubtedly great generality in the statement of these 
circumstances can be permitted so long as defendant is given 
fair notice of what is being asserted against him.18 
Thus, notice pleading after Conley focused on the defendant’s lack of 
entitlement to detailed allegations at the pleading stage. Rule 8(a)(2) 
entitled defendants to nothing more than fair notice. 
Certainly, Rule 9(b)’s “particularity” standard, which applies only to 
pleadings alleging fraud or mistake, stood in sharp contrast to the general 
understanding of the Rule 8(a)(2) standard.19 Consequently, the Supreme 
Court warned courts against requiring particularly detailed pleadings in 
cases governed by Rule 8(a)(2) rather than by Rule 9(b). For example, in 
Leatherman v. Tarrant County,20 a unanimous Court struck down what it 
deemed to be a heightened pleading requirement developed by the Fifth 
Circuit in a § 1983 action against two municipalities. Fifth Circuit 
precedent had required that such claims be stated “with factual detail and 
particularity.”21 In Leatherman, Justice William Rehnquist noted that 
§ 1983 claims were not among those subject to heightened pleading under 
9(b), and that, therefore, “litigants must rely on summary judgment and 
control of discovery,” rather than on high pleading standards, “to weed out 
unmeritorious claims sooner rather than later.”22 Similarly, in Swierkiewicz 
v. Sorema N.A.,23 the Supreme Court held that in an employment 
discrimination action whose pleadings were governed by Rule 8(a)(2), a 
complaint states a claim when it alleges generally that the plaintiff was 
terminated because of his race and national origin and includes some 
information regarding the dates and persons involved in the 
decisionmaking process. Even though precedent did—and still does—
require that plaintiffs in such cases eventually prove specific circumstances 
giving rise to an inference of discrimination,24 the Court held that their 
complaints need not plead such circumstances in any detail because the 
substantive precedent sets forth “an evidentiary standard, not a pleading 
requirement.”25 In the absence of a statute or Rule imposing a higher 
pleading standard in this context, defendants must use “liberal discovery 
rules and summary judgment motions” to combat non-meritorious 
claims.26 
Thus, on the eve of the Supreme Court’s 2007 Twombly decision, 
federal pleading standards were a fairly straightforward matter in first-year 
                                                                                                                     
 18. WRIGHT &  MILLER, supra note 8, at § 1202 (footnote omitted). 
 19. See FED. R. CIV . P. 9(b) (requiring that allegations of fraud or mistake be stated “with 
particularity”). 
 20. 507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993). 
 21. Id. at 167 (quoting Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1473 (5th Cir. 1985)). 
 22. Id. at 168–69. 
 23. 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002). 
 24. See id. at 510 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 512. 
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civil procedure courses around the country: the professor covered the 
lowering of the pleading threshold brought about by the advent of the 
Federal Rules, the Supreme Court’s explanation of notice pleading in cases 
like Conley, the Court’s applications of the notice-pleading standard in 
cases such as Swierkiewicz, and the Rule 9(b) exception to 8(a)(2)’s 
general standard—before marching through discovery and other topics in 
the casebook. 
B.  Twombly and Plausibility 
The pleadings leg of the civil procedure march became substantially 
rockier after the Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly.27 According to the leading treatise, the Twombly majority 
“articulated what appears to be a new ‘plausibility standard’ by which 
pleadings should be judged.”28 The plaintiffs in Twombly represented a 
massive putative class of consumers of local phone and internet services.29 
They alleged that their regional providers had agreed not to compete for 
business in each other’s territories, thereby keeping rates artificially high 
and violating federal antitrust laws.30 The consumer-plaintiffs believed an 
agreement was evident from the fact that each service provider had chosen 
to do business only in its own region—i.e., that the providers were 
engaging in “‘parallel’” rather than competitive conduct.31 In their 
complaint, the consumers described the nature of this parallel conduct and 
alleged generally that the providers had agreed not to enter into each 
other’s regional markets.32 
In holding that the general allegation of an agreement failed to state a 
claim under the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Supreme Court, with Justice 
David Souter writing for a seven-Justice majority, noted that parallel 
conduct was a common phenomenon in business, even in the absence of 
illegal agreements.33 The Court therefore concluded that the allegations of 
parallel conduct failed to render the general allegation of an illegal 
agreement plausible,34 and without a plausible allegation of an agreement, 
the complaint could not meet the Rule 8(a)(2) standard: 
                                                                                                                     
 27. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 28. WRIGHT &  MILLER, supra note 8, at § 1202 (Supp. 2010) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 
560). 
 29. 550 U.S. at 550. 
 30. Id. at 550–51. The plaintiffs also alleged that the defendant-service providers conspired to 
prevent new competitors from entering the defendants’ existing service areas. Id. 
 31. Id. at 551 (quoting Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint ¶ 51, Twombly v. 
Bell Atlantic Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (No. 02 Civ. 10220), 2003 WL 
25629874). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 553–54 (referring to conscious parallel conduct as “a common reaction of ‘firms in 
a concentrated market [that] recognize[e] their shared economic interests and their interdependence 
with respect to price and output decisions’” (quoting Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227 (1993))). 
 34. Id. at 564 (“When we look for plausibility in this complaint, we agree with the District 
Court that plaintiffs’ claim of conspiracy in restraint of trade comes up short.”). 
7
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The need at the pleading stage for allegations plausibly 
suggesting (not merely consistent with) agreement reflects the 
threshold requirement of Rule 8(a)(2) that the “plain 
statement” possess enough heft to “sho[w] that the pleader is 
entitled to relief.” A statement of parallel conduct . . . needs 
some setting suggesting the agreement . . . . An allegation of 
parallel conduct . . . gets the complaint close to stating a 
claim, but without some further factual enhancement it stops 
short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 
“entitle[ment] to relief.”35 
The Court suggested that allegations setting forth the specific time, place, 
and persons involved in the supposed agreement would render the 
existence of an agreement plausible and thus allow the complaint to meet 
the Rule 8(a)(2) standard.36 But of course, even if an illegal agreement had 
occurred, the plaintiffs had no access to such details at the pleading stage.  
The plaintiffs had argued that their general allegation of an agreement 
sufficed at the pleading stage because, under Conley v. Gibson, “a 
complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it 
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support 
of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”37 In response, the Supreme 
Court noted that this passage from Conley was not to be taken literally and 
cited several lower court opinions that had “questioned, criticized, and 
explained [it] away.”38 In the end, the Court announced that “after puzzling 
the profession for 50 years, this famous observation has earned its 
retirement.”39 
In an attempt to pre-empt criticism that Twombly’s plausibility test 
would allow courts to find facts at the pleading stage, Justice Souter’s 
majority opinion explained that “[a]sking for plausible grounds to infer an 
agreement does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; 
it simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that 
discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement.”40 The opinion also 
pointed to “the potentially enormous expense of discovery” as a reason to 
impose a plausibility standard at the pleading stage.41 Justice John Paul 
Stevens, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg in dissent, bemoaned the 
majority’s “dramatic departure from settled procedural law,”42 opining that 
the majority’s “‘plausibility’ standard is irreconcilable with Rule 8 and 
with our governing precedents”—including Swierkiewicz and 
Leatherman.43  
                                                                                                                     
 35. Id. at 557 (quoting FED. R. CIV . P. 8(a)(2)). 
 36. Id. at 564 n.10. 
 37. Id. at 561 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957)). 
 38. Id. at 562. 
 39. Id. at 563. 
 40. Id. at 556. 
 41. Id. at 559. 
 42. Id. at 573 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 43. Id. at 586. 
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Academic criticism of the Twombly decision was speedy and abundant. 
As a general matter, critics charged that Twombly imposed an 
impermissibly higher pleading standard that would restrict access to justice 
in a class of meritorious civil cases.44 Others debated questions that 
Twombly appeared to leave open, such as whether the decision was limited 
to the antitrust context or to the context of large, complex cases.45 Still 
others raised concerns as to where Twombly now set the bar for pleading 
other types of claims—especially discrimination claims.46 In sum, as the 
Second Circuit noted in 2007, the Supreme Court in Twombly had created 
“[c]onsiderable uncertainty concerning the standard for assessing the 
                                                                                                                     
 44. See, e.g., Dodson, supra note 7, at 139 (“[T]he Court’s standard is likely to bar many 
antitrust cases (and mass tort, discrimination, and a host of other cases) with merit.”); Randal C. 
Picker, Twombly, Leegin, and the Reshaping of Antitrust, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 161, 177 (“Twombly 
shrinks the domain of private plaintiffs and it does so without even a passing thought about what 
that will do to the overall level of antitrust enforcement.”); Robert E. Shapiro, Advance Sheet: 
Requiescat in Pace, 34 LITIG., Fall 2007, at 67, 67 (“Now, there can be no real quibbling that 
Justice Stevens was right, that the Court majority was suddenly veering away from the old rules of 
notice pleading.”); Spencer, supra note 7, at 433 (opining that Twombly’s plausibility standard is 
“an unwarranted interpretation of Rule 8 that will frustrate the efforts of plaintiffs with valid claims 
to get into court”); Tice, supra note 7, at 830 (“The Court’s decision in Twombly . . . . solidifies 
what has been a growing hostility toward litigation.”). Professor Stephen Burbank, with the benefit 
of two years of hindsight, commented in 2009 that to the extent Justice Souter and others in the 
Twombly majority did not view their decision as “a change in pleading standards that could 
fundamentally alter the role of litigation in American society,” their belief was “understandable but, 
at least in retrospect, naïve.” Burbank, supra note 7, at 114. A few commentators have argued that 
Twombly was consistent—or not very inconsistent—with precedent. See, e.g., Bone, Regulation of 
Court Access, supra note 7, at 883 (stating that Twombly does not “substantially tighten[] pleading 
requirements” and represents only a “modest” move away from traditional notice pleading); 
Douglas G. Smith, The Twombly Revolution?, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 1063, 1064–65 (2009) (arguing that 
the requirements of Twombly’s plausibility rule were “mandated by the Federal Rules” and form “an 
appropriate and necessary standard”). For a helpful summary of commentary on Twombly as of 
2008, see Hoffman, supra note 7, at 1234–38. 
 45. Compare Keith Bradley, Pleading Standards Should Not Change After B ll Atlantic v. 
Twombly, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 117, 120–21 (2007) (indicating that the Twombly 
plausibility rule is limited to antitrust cases), with Kendall W. Hannon, Note, Much Ado About 
Twombly? A Study on the Impact of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1811, 1814–15 (2008) (describing results of an empirical study indicating 
lower courts have applied the plausibility standard across many substantive areas), Joseph A. 
Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly: A Proposed Pleading Standard for Employment 
Discrimination Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1011, 1024–25 (stating that the question whether the 
plausibility standard applied to all types of claims had “no easy answer” but suggesting that such 
applicability was likely), and Ettie Ward, The After-Shocks of Twombly: Will We “Notice” 
Pleading Changes?, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 893, 910–13 (2008) (opining that a limitation of 
Twombly to antitrust claims or to complex cases was unlikely). 
 46. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 7, at 117 (predicting that “[e]mployment discrimination 
cases are one category likely to suffer at the hands of district judges implementing a contextual 
‘plausibility’ regime” under Twombly); Hannon, supra note 45, at 1815 (reporting on an empirical 
study indicating that “[t]he rate of dismissal in civil rights cases has spiked in the four months since 
Twombly”); Seiner, supra note 45, at 1035–41 (surveying lower courts’ applications of the 
Twombly standard to employment discrimination claims). 
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adequacy of pleadings.”47 
C.  Iqbal 
Against this backdrop, a civil rights case brought by Javaid Iqbal was 
percolating through the federal court system. As a result of post-September 
11th terrorism investigations, the federal government had identified over 
one hundred persons “of high interest,” and this group included Iqbal, a 
Pakistani Muslim living in the United States.48 Iqbal’s Bivens complaint49 
alleged that this designation led to his detention at a maximum security 
facility where, he further alleged, guards brutally beat him and denied him 
the opportunity to engage in daily prayer and religious study.50 His 
complaint named as defendants his prison guards and wardens, but most 
significantly, it also named then-Attorney General John Ashcroft and FBI 
Director Robert Mueller.51 Paragraph sixty-nine of Iqbal’s complaint 
alleged that the “‘policy of holding post-September-11th detainees in 
highly restrictive conditions of confinement until they were “cleared” by 
the FBI was approved by Defendants ASHCROFT and MUELLER in 
discussions in the weeks after September 11, 2001.’”52 Paragraph ninety-
six alleged that these two defendants “‘each knew of, condoned, and 
willfully and maliciously agreed to subject’” Iqbal to the harsh conditions 
of confinement “‘as a matter of policy, solely on account of [his] religion, 
race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate penological interest.’”53 
The complaint labeled Ashcroft the “principal architect” of this policy and 
alleged that Mueller was “instrumental in [the policy’s] adoption, 
promulgation, and implementation.”54 
Ashcroft and Mueller moved in the district court for dismissal of the 
claims against them, arguing that their qualified immunity required the 
complaint to show their personal involvement in constitutional violations 
and that Iqbal’s allegations failed to do so.55 The court denied their motion, 
pointing to the above allegations and citing the “no set of facts” language 
from Conley v. Gibson.56 While the Second Circuit was considering 
Ashcroft and Mueller’s interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court issued its 
                                                                                                                     
 47. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 155 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 
1937 (2009). 
 48. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1943. 
 49. Named for Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Narcotics Bureau, 403 U.S. 
388 (1971), a Bivens complaint alleges a constitutional violation on the part of federal agents and 
seeks monetary damages. 
 50. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1955 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing First Amended Complaint and 
Jury Demand). 
 51. First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand at 1–2, Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04-CV-
01809, 2005 WL 2375202 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005), 2004 WL 3756442. 
 52. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1944 (quoting First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, supra 
note 51, at 13–14). 
 53. Id. (quoting First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 51, at 17–18). 
 54. First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 51, at 4–5. 
 55. See Elmaghraby, 2005 WL 2375202, at *20. 
 56. Id. at *11. 
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decision in Twombly, which lay to rest Conley’s “no set of facts” language 
and imposed the plausibility standard on pleadings.57 Applying Twombly, 
the Second Circuit held that the complaint sufficiently alleged Ashcroft’s 
and Mueller’s personal involvement in allegedly discriminatory policy 
decisions.58 
In May 2009, Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for a five-justice 
majority of the Supreme Court, reversed the Second Circuit and held that 
Iqbal had failed to state a claim against Ashcroft and Mueller under Rule 
8(a)(2).59 First, the Court held that because Ashcroft and Mueller were 
subject to qualified immunity, Iqbal was required to plead his claims 
against them with “sufficient factual matter to show that [they] adopted 
and implemented the detention policies at issue not for a neutral, 
investigative reason but for the purpose of discriminating on account of 
race, religion, or national origin.”60 
Next, the majority explained that it need not accept “legal conclusions” 
in the complaint as true for purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.61 The 
majority then identified the particular allegations it deemed to be legal 
conclusions. These included paragraphs alleging that Ashcroft and Mueller 
“‘knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed’” to subject 
Iqbal to harsh conditions of confinement “‘as a matter of policy, solely on 
account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin’”; that Ashcroft was 
the “‘principal architect’” of this discriminatory policy; and that Mueller 
was “‘instrumental’” in the policy’s adoption and execution.62 The 
remaining allegations, which were entitled to be taken as true, stated 
nothing about a discriminatory motive on the Ashcroft’s and Mueller’s 
parts; instead, they noted principally that Mueller’s FBI detained thousands 
of Arab Muslim men after September 11th and that Ashcroft and Mueller 
had discussed and approved a policy of holding high-interest detainees in 
highly restrictive conditions.63  
Lastly, the Supreme Court majority engaged in a Twombly-style 
analysis, considering whether these remaining allegations “plausibly” 
showed that Ashcroft and Mueller had “purposefully adopted a policy of 
classifying post-September-11 detainees as ‘of high interest’ because of 
their race, religion, or national origin.”64 Of course, because the Court had 
                                                                                                                     
 57. See supra notes 33–39 and accompanying text. 
 58. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 174–76 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 59. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1954 (2009). 
 60. Id. at 1948–49. Justice Souter, in dissent, disputed the majority opinion on this point by 
arguing that Ashcroft and Mueller had earlier conceded that a weaker standard applied; specifically, 
Justice Souter pointed to Ashcroft and Mueller’s petition for certiorari, in which they had indicated 
that officials in their position could be liable merely for exhibiting “deliberate indifference” to the 
known discriminatory conduct of their subordinates. Id. at 1956 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari). 
 61. Id. at 1949–50 (majority opinion). 
 62. Id. at 1951 (quoting First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 51, at 4–5, 
17–18). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 1952. 
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already chosen to disregard the allegations averring Ashcroft’s and 
Mueller’s discriminatory intent and their direct involvement in the 
allegedly discriminatory policy, the result of the plausibility analysis was a 
foregone conclusion: the majority held that Iqbal’s complaint did not 
“contain any factual allegation sufficient to plausibly suggest petitioners’ 
discriminatory state of mind.”65 
Justice Souter, who had authored the majority opinion in Twombly, 
disagreed vehemently with the Iqbal majority’s approach to the plausibility 
analysis.66 Specifically, he objected to the majority’s characterization of 
allegations regarding discriminatory intent as mere legal conclusions. He 
distinguished these allegations from the Twombly allegation asserting that 
the defendant-service providers had conspired not to compete in each 
others’ territories.67 Souter in Twombly had labeled the conspiracy 
allegation a mere conclusion because it failed to define the time, place, or 
scope of the conspiracy and because it failed to show any connection 
between the alleged conspiracy and the defendants’ parallel conduct 
described elsewhere in the complaint.68 In contrast, in Iqbal, Souter’s 
dissent stressed that the complaint had alleged that Ashcroft and Mueller 
“knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to 
subject” [Iqbal] to a particular, discrete, discriminatory policy 
detailed in the complaint. Iqbal does not say merely that 
Ashcroft was the architect of some amorphous discrimination, 
or that Mueller was instrumental in an ill-defined 
constitutional violation; he alleges that they helped to create 
the discriminatory policy he has described.69 
As a result, Souter wrote that the Court was bound to accept the allegations 
of discrimination as true for purposes of the 12(b)(6) motion and, 
therefore, to conclude that the complaint had stated a claim. 
Thus, the Iqbal majority had taken Twombly beyond its author’s 
intentions. Specifically, in categorizing allegations as either factual 
contentions or ignorable legal conclusions, the Iqbal majority had 
interpreted the legal-conclusion category very broadly indeed—certainly 
more broadly than Justice Souter had contemplated. The majority’s 
application of Twombly in Iqbal thus makes 12(b)(6) dismissal a threat to 
even more potentially meritorious lawsuits. This threat has generated not 
                                                                                                                     
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 1955 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Stephen Breyer was the other Iqbal dissenter 
who had been among the majority in Twombly. See id. at 1961 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 67. Id. at 1959–60 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 68. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 565 n.10 (noting that the complaint 
failed to specify which service providers allegedly participated in an illegal agreement and when 
and where the alleged agreement took place); id. at 556–57 (“Without more, parallel conduct does 
not suggest conspiracy, and a conclusory allegation of agreement at some unidentified point does 
not supply facts adequate to show illegality.”). 
 69. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1961 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting First Amended Complaint and 
Jury Demand, supra note 51, at 17). 
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only scholarly criticism70 but also Congressional hearings71 and proposed 
federal legislation to undo the changes wrought by the two cases.72  
III.   A CLOSE READING OF IQBAL: ENTITLEMENT AND 
DISENTITLEMENT,   MEASURING AND JUDGING 
Despite the arguably significant changes to established pleading law 
wrought by both Twombly and Iqbal, their linguistic surfaces appear 
relatively calm. A closer reading, however, shows that the text of the 
majority opinion in Iqbal makes two revealing moves that couch the 
Court’s plausibility analysis as a noncontroversial application of existing 
pleading doctrine. First, Justice Kennedy’s references to “entitlement” and 
related terms shift the analytical frame so that Iqbal’s argument against 
dismissal appears as an inappropriate request for special treatment. Second, 
the Iqbal opinion, like Twombly before it, relies on a judging-as-measuring 
metaphor that associates the plausibility test with notions of consistency 
and objectivity. 
A.  The Language of Entitlement as a Frame-Shifting Device 
Any legally trained reader would expect the Court to mention the word 
“entitlement” in a decision exploring the boundaries of Rule 8(a)(2). The 
Rule, after all, requires pleaders to set forth “a short and plain statement of 
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”73 Similarly, one 
would expect the term to turn up in cases where a government official 
relies on the doctrine of qualified immunity, given that qualified immunity 
is both a defense to liability and a limited “entitlement not to stand trial or 
face the other burdens of litigation.”74 
The majority opinion in Iqbal certainly refers to entitlement in these 
straightforward contexts,75 but it also phrases its ruling against Iqbal as the 
                                                                                                                     
 70. For scholarly criticism of Twombly, see supra note 44. For scholarly criticism of Iqbal, 
see, e.g., Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited, supra note 7, at 867 (commenting that Iqbal’s 
overall approach is “incoherent” and that its plausibility analysis is stricter than that of Twombly 
and “not appropriate for many cases”); Burbank, supra note 7, at 115–16 (commenting that the 
Iqbal majority wrought “mischief” by inconsistently choosing to ignore certain  allegations, thereby 
leaving open an “invitation to the lower courts to make ad hoc decisions, often reflecting buried 
policy choices”). Professors Helen Hershkoff and Arthur Miller have asserted that Twombly and 
Iqbal have precipitated a “‘contemporary crisis’ of rulemaking” through a “radical reinterpretation” 
of Rules 8 and 12(b)(6). Helen Hershkoff & Arthur R. Miller, Celebrating Jack H. Friedenthal: The 
Views of Two Co-authors, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 9, 28 (2009). 
 71. See generally Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans’ Access to Courts? Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009) (webcast available at 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?id=4189); Access to Justice Denied: Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009) (webcast available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/hear_  
091027_1.html). 
 72. Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 73. FED. R. CIV . P. 8(a)(2). 
 74. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). 
 75. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (“When there are well-pleaded 
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denial of an entitlement he has mistakenly assumed. According to the 
majority, Iqbal “is not entitled to discovery, cabined or otherwise,”76 and 
he was wrong to “expect” his allegations of discriminatory intent to allow 
his complaint to survive dismissal.77 These allegations are “not entitled to 
the assumption of truth,”78 and Rule 8 “does not empower” Iqbal to change 
that fact.79 
This language accomplishes a shift in frame80 with respect to older 
understandings of notice pleading. Traditional notice pleading 
jurisprudence emphasized that defendants lacked entitlement to detailed 
allegations at the pleading stage.81 By speaking instead in terms of the 
plaintiff’s lack of entitlement—a lack of entitlement to proceed to litigation 
absent a showing of a plausible claim—the Iqbal opinion reframes the 
12(b)(6) picture. Specifically, this new use of the language of entitlement 
transforms the plaintiff from someone who was generally presumed to 
have a right to proceed to discovery into someone who is being 
presumptuous and displaying an outsized sense of entitlement in even 
requesting to proceed.  
The subtlety of this frame-shift obscures the fact that the majority 
opinion is actually implementing an enormous change in the law of federal 
pleadings. Twombly’s plausibility test increased the level of detail 
necessary to survive a motion to dismiss,82 and Iqbal’s implementation of 
that test narrowed the set of allegations that could count as “factual” and 
thus weigh in favor of plausibility.83 Nevertheless, the Court in both cases 
insists that it is simply applying existing law.84 With respect to the Iqbal 
                                                                                                                     
factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly 
give rise to an entitlement to relief.”); id. at 1953 (“Our rejection of the careful-case-management 
approach is especially important in suits where Government-official defendants are entitled to assert 
the defense of qualified immunity.”). 
 76. Id. at 1954. 
 77. Id.  
 78. Id. at 1950; see also id. at 1951 (“We begin our analysis by identifying the allegations in 
the complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth. . . . [T]he allegations are conclusory 
and not entitled to be assumed true.”). 
 79. Id. at 1954. 
 80. See STEVEN PINKER, THE STUFF OF THOUGHT 243 (2007) (providing numerous examples of 
frame-shifting language and asserting that “[m]any disagreements in human affairs turn not on 
differences in data or logic but on how a problem is framed”). 
 81. See supra notes 12–18 and accompanying text. 
 82. See supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text. 
 83. See supra notes 66–72 and accompanying text. 
 84. The Twombly opinion asserts at several points that both its plausibility test and its 
retirement of Conley’s “no set of facts” language comply with precedent. For example, it states that 
any conflict between the majority’s analysis and Conley is merely “ostensible,” Bell Atlantic Corp. 
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 560–61 (2007), and that the majority’s analysis “comports with this 
Court’s statements in the years since Conley,” id. at 563 n.8. The opinion also indicates that its 
plausibility test is consistent with precedent when it notes that the Twombly plaintiffs “do not, of 
course, dispute the requirement of plausibility.” Id. at 560 (emphasis added). The Iqbal opinion, in 
turn, emphasizes that its analysis is merely applying Twombly. Indeed, in Parts IV.A–B of the 
opinion, where the majority applies Rule 8(a)(2) specifically to Iqbal’s complaint, the Court cites 
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opinion, Justice Kennedy’s deft use of the language of entitlement shifts 
the frame so subtly that we hardly notice the significance of the 
accompanying doctrinal change. Indeed, only once does the opinion’s 
entitlement language inadvertently betray itself and indicate that a change 
in the law has occurred: Justice Kennedy at one point explains that it is the 
“conclusory nature” of Iqbal’s discrimination allegations that “disentitles 
them to the presumption of truth.”85 Presumably, that which is now 
“disentitled” was once entitled, even if the Iqbal majority insists it is only 
implementing Twombly, and the Twombly majority insists it is only 
applying the existing law. 
Elsewhere in the Iqbal opinion, the entitlement frame-shift inspires 
further language indicating that Iqbal is asking for special treatment in 
opposing the motion to dismiss. For example, the entitlement frame-shift 
no doubt underlies the majority’s characterization of Iqbal’s argument as 
seeking “license” to “evade” the Rules’ pleading requirements.86 Once 
again, Iqbal appears to be expecting indulgence. In reality, Iqbal had 
argued not that he should be excused from having to comply with the 
Rules but rather that his complaint did comply with the Rules. His 
argument, as described at that point in the opinion, was based on Rule 9(b), 
which allowed him to allege Ashcroft’s and Mueller’s discriminatory 
motive “generally.”87 Iqbal’s interpretation of “generally” was consistent 
with that of the Supreme Court in Swierkiewicz, which held that a similarly 
general allegation of discriminatory motive was sufficient to state a 
claim.88 Indeed, his position on this point was particularly compelling, 
given that the Twombly Court had taken pains to explain that it was not 
overruling Swierkiewicz.89 Thus, the majority characterizes Iqbal as 
seeking “license” to get the Court to follow its own, recently reaffirmed 
precedent. 
                                                                                                                     
Twombly twenty-two times. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949–52. 
 85. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951. 
 86. Id. at 1954. The note of deception inherent in the word “evade” also echoes in the Court’s 
statement that it need not assume the truth of “‘a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.’” 
Id. at 1950 (emphasis added) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 
 87. Id. at 1954 (citing FED. R. CIV . P. 9(b)). 
 88. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 (2002); see also supra notes 23–26 and 
accompanying text. 
 89. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 569–70. Despite the Court’s attempt to reconcile its decisions in 
Twombly and Iqbal with Swierkiewicz, lower courts have split as to whether the two more recent 
decisions have effectively overruled the earlier case. Compare Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 
F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009) (“We have to conclude . . . that because Conl y has been specifically 
repudiated by both Twombly and Iqbal, so too has Swierkiewicz, at least insofar as it concerns 
pleading requirements and relies on Conley.”), with Gillman v. Inner City Broad. Corp., No. 08 Civ. 
8909, 2009 WL 3003244, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2009) (“Iqbal was not meant to displace 
Swierkiewicz’s teachings about pleading standards for employment discrimination claims because in 
Twombly, which heavily informed Iqbal, the Supreme Court explicitly affirmed the vitality of 
Swierkiewicz.”). Within the Fourth Circuit, one district court has noted simply that “the impact of 
Twombly and Iqbal on employment discrimination cases . . . is still unsettled.” Murchison v. Astrue, 
No. 08-cv-02665-JFM, 2010 WL 46410, at *10, n.10 (D. Md. Jan. 6, 2010). 
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And Iqbal’s argument is not just a special request for license; it is an 
“invitation to relax the pleading requirements.”90 One can almost hear the 
majority saying, “But if we relaxed the rules for you, we’d have to do it for 
everybody.” Of course, whether rules are being “relaxed” or merely 
“applied” is a matter of perspective. From Justice Souter’s perspective, the 
Iqbal majority was neither relaxing Rule 8 nor applying it in a manner 
consistent with Twombly.91 Instead, the Iqbal majority was increasing the 
Rule’s requirements for Iqbal and all future civil plaintiffs. The status quo 
ante can be described as “relaxed” only after this ratcheting occurs. Thus, 
by labeling Iqbal’s argument as a request for relaxation of the pleading 
requirements, the majority was able to obscure the fact that it was, indeed, 
increasing those requirements. 
The language of entitlement and of outsized expectations appears 
elsewhere in the opinion as well. After labeling Iqbal’s direct allegations of 
discrimination as conclusory, and thus setting them aside, the Court 
identifies the remaining, factual allegations and notes that Iqbal “asks us to 
infer” discrimination from them.92 These allegations stated merely that 
Mueller’s FBI arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim men after 
September 11th and that Ashcroft and Mueller agreed to a policy of 
holding high-interest detainees in highly restrictive conditions.93 The Court 
held that these factual allegations did not give rise to a plausible inference 
of discrimination on Ashcroft’s and Mueller’s parts, and that “[i]t should 
come as no surprise” that a legitimate policy of arresting and detaining 
those with suspected links to the September 11th tragedy would have a 
disparate impact on Arab Muslims, given that the September 11th 
perpetrators were themselves Arab Muslims.94 Thus, according to the 
majority, Iqbal had “ask[ed]”95 the Court to draw an inference of 
discrimination that ran counter to an “‘obvious alternative explanation.’”96  
In fact, Iqbal had asked for no such inference at all. He had explicitly 
alleged discriminatory intent on the part of Ashcroft and Mueller, rather 
than leaving it to be inferred. It was only after the majority effectively 
struck his direct allegations of discrimination that his argument morphed 
into a seemingly unreasonable request for an inference. Once these 
allegations were disregarded, the majority’s ruling on the plausibility of 
discrimination may have been “no surprise,” but many have expressed 
surprise that the Court chose to disregard the direct allegations of 
discrimination in the first place.97 
                                                                                                                     
 90. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953–54. 
 91. Id. at 1958–61 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 92. Id. at 1951–52 (majority opinion). 
 93. Id. at 1951 (citing First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 51, at 10). 
 94. Id. at 1951–52. 
 95. Id. at 1952. 
 96. Id. at 1951 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 555 U.S. 544, 567 (2007)). 
 97. See id. at 1960–61 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“By my lights, there is no principled basis for 
the majority’s disregard of the allegations linking Ashcroft and Mueller to their subordinates’ 
discrimination.”). For scholarly commentary criticizing the majority’s disregard of Iqbal’s 
allegations, see supra note 70. 
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Lastly, the entitlement frame-shift appears to drive the opinion’s 
characterization of Iqbal’s lawsuit as a “substantial diversion” for high 
federal officials, who must instead spend their time executing the work of 
the government in a time of national emergency.98 This characterization 
may be apt in the context of the qualified immunity defense raised by 
Ashcroft and Mueller and the post-September 11th backdrop of the case, 
but it also sums up a more general hostility to litigation exhibited in both 
Twombly and Iqbal. The Iqbal opinion goes on to note that litigation 
through the discovery phase will exact “heavy costs in terms of efficiency 
and expenditure of valuable time and resources” and that it is impossible 
for a district court to manage discovery in a way that would effectively 
minimize these costs.99 The Twombly majority mentioned a similar 
justification for its ruling, noting that discovery in the potentially enormous 
antitrust action would impose an extreme burden on the defendant-service 
providers.100 Perhaps a Rule amendment could one day define a class of 
large or complex cases to be subject to a pleading standard higher than that 
of Rule 8(a)(2). However, by effectively imposing a higher standard 
through judicial interpretation of Rule 8, the Court in Twombly and Iqbal 
has ratcheted up the requirements for all civil plaintiffs, whatever the size 
and nature of their claims. Even in actions where qualified immunity can 
never come into play, the threatened continuation of a lawsuit to the 
discovery phase has now become a “substantial diversion” that, absent a 
showing of plausibility, a plaintiff is not entitled to create. 
B.  The Judging-as-Measuring Metaphor 
In addition to using frame-shifting to cast Iqbal’s plausibility argument 
in a particular light, the Iqbal opinion, like Twombly before it, relies on a 
judging-as-measuring metaphor to reinforce the legitimacy of the 
plausibility test itself. Theorists of metaphor have noted that humans often 
speak of abstract concepts by relating them to more concrete and familiar 
physical experiences.101 Thus, love might be spoken of as a journey, or 
language might be compared to a container that holds ideas.102 Indeed, 
people speak of ideas themselves as physical objects103 that can be “big” or 
“heavy” or “deep.” In a similar vein, judging can be compared to 
measuring—the act of using a ruler or a scale to determine the length or 
                                                                                                                     
 98. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558–59. 
 101. See, e.g., GEORGE LAKOFF &  MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 25 (1980) (“Our 
experience of physical objects and substances provides a . . . basis for understanding . . . . Once we 
can identify our experiences as entities or substances, we can refer to them, categorize them, group 
them, and quantify them—and, by this means, reason about them.”); PINKER, supra note 80, at 237 
(“[E]ven the airiest of our ideas are expressed . . . in thumpingly concrete metaphors.”). 
 102. See LAKOFF &  JOHNSON, supra note 101, at 11–12 (discussing the metaphor that linguistic 
expressions are containers for meaning); id. at 85 (discussing metaphors regarding love, including 
the metaphor that love is a journey); PINKER, supra note 80, at 240 (listing variations of the love-is-
a-journey metaphor). 
 103. LAKOFF &  JOHNSON, supra note 101, at 10–11. 
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weight of a given idea or argument. 
Metaphors like those above have been called conceptual metaphors, 
because they suggest a particular conception of their targets (whether love, 
or language, or ideas, or judging) that can generate families of related 
metaphors, tropes, and images.104 For example, if love is a journey, one 
might speak of a relationship that has stalled, or encountered bumps in the 
road, or arrived at a crossroad.105 In the case of the Iqbal decision, the 
implicit conceptual metaphor of judging-as-measuring spurs two more 
specific metaphors to which the text of the opinion repeatedly refers: the 
first posits Iqbal’s allegations as physical objects whose mass can be 
determined,  and the second posits them as physical forces that may or may 
not propel his claim across a fixed line between possibility and plausibility. 
Both of these images associate the plausibility analysis with notions of 
consistency and objectivity, while obscuring the fact that Iqbal entrusts the 
plausibility question not to yardsticks and scales, but to a judge’s “judicial 
experience and common sense.”106 
1.  Allegations as Having Mass 
The Iqbal majority’s text frequently refers to the complaint’s 
allegations as lacking sufficient mass or physical substance to state a 
plausible claim. For example, the opinion begins by noting that “‘naked 
assertion[s]’”107 and “[t]hreadbare recitals” of elements108 are insufficient. 
These images recall Twombly’s reference to “the threshold requirement of 
Rule 8(a)(2) that the ‘plain statement’ possess enough heft” to show 
entitlement to relief.109 Further, the Iqbal opinion notes that a complaint’s 
allegations must register more than a “sheer possibility” that the defendant 
may be liable.110 In addition, in setting aside Iqbal’s direct allegations of 
discrimination, the Court refers to them as “bare” assertions that therefore 
add nothing of substance to the plausibility determination.111 The opinion 
refers to legal conclusions as providing an empty “framework” that lacks 
the substance to state a claim unless that framework is supported with 
factual allegations.112 
The word choices above give the persuasive force of Iqbal’s allegations 
a measurable physicality. One need only view and weigh the allegations to 
determine whether they are sheer or hefty, bare frameworks or massive 
reinforced structures. Thus, the plausibility analysis is reduced to a 
physical process of observing and measuring mass, and the results of this 
process will be reassuringly consistent and seemingly objective. In this 
                                                                                                                     
 104. PINKER, supra note 80, at 240. 
 105. Id.  
 106. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). 
 107. Id. at 1949 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (quoting FED. R. CIV . P. 8(a)(2)). 
 110. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. 
 111. Id. at 1951. 
 112. Id. at 1950. 
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way, the mass-related images hide the breadth of discretion Iqbal grants to 
judges applying the plausibility test.113 Additionally, it is worth noting that 
several of the adjectives the Court uses to describe lack of mass—“naked,” 
“threadbare,” and “bare”—also refer to lack of clothing. These choices 
evoke the revelation from the fairy tale that the emperor has no clothes. In 
so doing, they reinforce the idea that Iqbal, like the emperor, has 
unreasonable expectations regarding the reception to which his 
presentation is entitled.  
2.  Allegations as Crossing a Line 
In describing the plausibility analysis, both the Twombly and Iqbal 
opinions speak in terms of a fixed line separating the merely possible from 
the plausible. For example, the Twombly opinion, later quoted in Iqbal, 
describes a complaint whose insufficient allegations cause the pleading to 
“stop[] short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 
‘entitle[ment] to relief.’”114 Similarly, the Iqbal majority, quoting 
Twombly, explains that dismissal of the complaint is warranted because 
Iqbal’s allegations have not “‘nudg[ed]’ his claim of purposeful 
discrimination ‘across the line from conceivable to plausible.’”115 This 
emphasis on a fixed line allows both opinions to indicate that they are not 
increasing the showing required to state a claim; the line between stating a 
claim and not doing so is still fixed in the same location where it has 
always been, and the pre-Twombly requirements for stating a claim 
therefore remain the same. This line image also indicates that it is possible 
to differentiate consistently between the possible and the plausible; one 
need only look to see whether the allegations have crossed some agreed-
upon, fixed boundary. 
The line image, of course, obscures as much as it clarifies. As explained 
above, rather than measuring the plaintiffs’ complaints against some 
eternally fixed line, Twombly and Iqbal each appear to have drawn new 
lines by increasing the level of detail required for allegations to state a 
claim. Thus, “the line” is not a pre-existing boundary against which 
allegations may be measured; instead, it is the product of an individual 
court’s exercise of its own discretion in deciding whether a given 
complaint plausibly suggests a right to relief. It is an individually 
determined outcome rather than an external aid to arriving at an outcome. 
Further, the line metaphor serves to obscure the slippery nature of the 
“judicial experience and common sense” that Iqbal instructs courts to use 
when determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim.116 As 
Professor Steven Burbank has noted, “[j]udgments about the plausibility of 
a complaint are necessarily comparative” and depend on “a judge’s 
background knowledge and assumptions, which seem every bit as 
                                                                                                                     
 113. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 114. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (quoting FED. R. CIV . P. 8(a)(2)), quoted in Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 
1949. 
 115. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1952 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 
 116. Id. at 1950. 
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vulnerable to the biasing effect of that individual’s cultural predispositions 
as are judgments about adjudicative facts.”117 
IV.   WHY FRAMES AND METAPHORS IN JUDICIAL OPINIONS MATTER 
In a January 2010 town hall meeting, South Carolina Lieutenant 
Governor Andre Bauer used the following words to explain his position 
that the government should be more active in holding accountable those 
whose families receive public assistance such as free or reduced-price 
school lunches:  
My grandmother . . . told me as a small child to quit feeding 
stray animals. You know why? Because they breed. You’re 
facilitating the problem if you give an animal or a person 
ample food supply. They will reproduce, especially ones that 
don’t think too much further than that. And so what you’ve 
got to do is you’ve got to curtail that type of behavior. They 
don’t know any better.118 
While the Lieutenant Governor shortly thereafter told reporters he 
regretted the remarks,119 reaction to the way in which his words had framed 
the debate was voluminous.120 The volume and fervor of the response 
indicates that people sense inherently that metaphors and other framing 
devices have power to guide thoughts and actions—and that the frames and 
metaphors adopted by government decision makers can therefore have 
significant practical consequences.121 
                                                                                                                     
 117. Burbank, supra note 7, at 118. 
 118. Nathaniel Cary, Bauer: Needy ‘Owe Something Back’ for Aid, THE STATE (Columbia, 
S.C.), Jan. 23, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.thestate.com/local/v-print/story/1123844.html.  
 119. Roddie Burris, Bauer Regrets Stray Remarks, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Jan. 26, 2010, 
at A1, available at http://www.thestate.com/2010/01/26/v-print/1127678.html. A linguistic analysis 
of Bauer’s explanation that he regretted the remark specifically because “now it’s being used as an 
analogy, not a metaphor,” id., is beyond the scope of this Article.  
 120. Within the state of South Carolina, letters to the editor regarding the stray-animal 
metaphor continued to appear in newspapers even two weeks after the speech. Se , e.g., Vince 
Ward, Letter to the Editor, Bauer Reveals Much with Animal Comment, THE STATE (Columbia, 
S.C.), Feb. 5, 2010, available at http://www.thestate.com/letters/v-print/story/1142447.html. In all, 
The State newspaper in Columbia, South Carolina, received well over 100 letters in response to 
Bauer’s comments, and this number “far and away dwarfs the number of letters typically received 
regarding a state or local issue.” Telephone Interview with Claudia Raby, Letters to the Editor 
Dep’t, The State (Feb. 15, 2010). Reaction outside the state was voluminous as well. My Google 
search of the words “Andre Bauer stray animals” on Feb. 9, 2010, retrieved over 450,000 entries. A 
New York Times editorial, published a few days after the remarks were made, condemned the 
metaphor but noted that it had “at least stirred an encouraging furor.” Editorial, So It’s Granny’s 
Fault?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2010, at A32, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/28/opi  
nion/28thu3.html. 
 121. Donald A. Schön has insightfully described the role that metaphorical frames play in the 
setting of social policy. See Donald A. Schön, Generative Metaphor: A Perspective on Problem-
Setting in Social Policy, in METAPHOR AND THOUGHT 137, 143–50 (Andrew Ortony ed., 2d ed. 
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Theorists in several fields have attested to the persuasive power of 
metaphor and its relation to human cognition. Linguist George Lakoff and 
philosopher Mark Johnson have famously argued that human thought 
processes are largely metaphorical122 and that metaphors can create reality 
in the sense that they structure the way in which people perceive their 
experiences in the world.123 According to these two theorists, once a 
person accepts a specific metaphor, that metaphor may guide the person’s 
actions, and those “actions will, of course, fit the metaphor,” turning the 
metaphor into a “self-fulfilling prophec[y].”124  
Cognitive psychologist Steven Pinker has posited a more moderate 
approach, asserting that while “conceptual metaphor really does have 
profound implications for the understanding of language and thought,”125 
humans “can’t think with a metaphor alone.”126 Pinker nevertheless 
acknowledges that metaphors “are not just literary garnishes but aids to 
reason [that] can power sophisticated inferences.”127 In the legal context, 
theorist Steven L. Winter has noted that a metaphor “colors and controls 
our subsequent thinking about its subject” and “enables us to see systems 
of analogies not previously recognized.”128 He has argued that some of the 
most forceful metaphors in American jurisprudence, such as the 
envisioning of free speech as “a marketplace of ideas,” did not spring free-
form from their authors’ pens but instead arose from the combination of 
existing conceptual metaphors (such as the ideas-are-objects metaphor) and 
societal changes (such as the rise of laissez-faire capitalism) that for the 
first time enabled a particular comparison to carry revelatory and 
persuasive force.129 
Under any theory, metaphors operate by highlighting points of 
experienced similarity between a source concept, such as a journey, and a 
target concept, such as love.130 In so doing, of course, they also hide or 
suppress attributes of the target that do not correspond to any attributes of 
the source.131 For example, the metaphor of labor-as-resource highlights 
that labor can be quantified (in terms of hours worked) and that it can be 
assigned a value, but the metaphor suppresses notions concerning who is 
                                                                                                                     
1993) (using the urban renewal movement of the 1960s as a case study). 
 122. See generally LAKOFF &  JOHNSON, supra note 101 (arguing that all cognition except the 
most fundamental thinking regarding primary physical experiences is metaphorical). 
 123. Id. at 144–46. 
 124. Id. at 156. 
 125. PINKER, supra note 80, at 247. 
 126. Id. at 251. 
 127. Id. at 253. 
 128. Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 
STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1383 (1988). 
 129. See WINTER, supra note 1, at 271–73. 
 130. See Winter, supra note 128, at 1383–84 (explaining that a metaphor “carrie[s] over” 
attributes of the source and applies them to the target). 
 131. Id. at 1386–87 (explaining that metaphor hides dissimilarities between a target and a 
source, reducing these dissimilarities to “a species of epistemic ‘noise’”) (internal citation omitted). 
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performing the labor and how meaningful it is to him or her.132 And it is 
from this highlighting of some ideas and the suppressing of others that 
metaphors draw their persuasive force.133  
In the context of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, we do not ordinarily think of the 
Supreme Court as needing to use metaphor and framing to persuade an 
audience of the correctness of a decision it has issued. The Court, after all, 
is the final authority. However, Steven L. Winter has perceptively argued 
that “the higher the court, the larger the audience that must be 
persuaded”134 because in Western societies, where “‘law’ is synonymous 
with objective delineations of right and wrong . . . a court can produce that 
automatic, tacit sense of validity only if its judgments conform with the 
most conventional values of the culture.”135 
In the Iqbal majority opinion, the entitlement frame-shift described in 
Part III persuades, subtly, by highlighting the risk that, if Rule 8(a)(2) is 
interpreted loosely, an “unentitled” plaintiff with a non-meritorious claim 
will impose upon a defendant the burdens of discovery. Of course, the 
frame-shift simultaneously and persuasively suppresses the risk that, under 
the plausibility test, some plaintiffs with meritorious claims will 
experience dismissal simply because they lack access to detailed evidence 
at the pleading stage. The judging-as-measuring metaphor buttresses this 
persuasive effect by offering assurance that judges can make consistent and 
objective decisions regarding who is and is not entitled to proceed to 
discovery.  
To the extent that 20th Century notice-pleading jurisprudence 
emphasized the entitlement of a plaintiff to proceed to discovery upon 
providing fair notice,136 perhaps the entitlement frame-shift, with its 
characterization of a plaintiff as having an outsized sense of entitlement, 
was a predictable 21st Century rejoinder to that jurisprudence, given the 
growing perception that the Federal Rules discovery process had grown 
significantly more burdensome in the intervening years.137 In highlighting 
this burden, the frame-shift is seductive. The judging-as-measuring 
metaphor is equally seductive to a society that longs to equate judicial 
                                                                                                                     
 132. LAKOFF &  JOHNSON, supra note 101, at 65–68. 
 133. Winter, supra note 128, at 1387 (explaining how, through highlighting and suppressing 
certain aspects of a target concept, a metaphor can come to be recognized as representing the truth 
about the target). 
 134. WINTER, supra note 1, at 322. 
 135. Id. at 323. 
 136. See supra notes 8–18 and accompanying text. 
 137. Bryant Garth in 1998 noted that while empirical studies showed that the discovery 
process worked reasonably efficiently in the great majority of cases, discovery in the much smaller 
group of complex, high-stakes cases was characterized by “dissatisfaction, delay and expense.” 
Bryant G. Garth, Two Worlds of Civil Discovery: From Studies of Cost and Delay to the Markets in 
Legal Services and Legal Reform, 39 B.C. L. REV. 597, 605 (1998). Because the lawyers handling 
these complex cases were often prosperous and prominent, they tended to have a greater voice at 
conferences and on committees examining issues of civil discovery, and their experiences of 
“enormous problems” with discovery tended to dominate the debate. Id. 
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decisionmaking with objectivity.138 However, the important question is not 
whether the frames and metaphors seduce but whether they have led to a 
decision that comports with the foundational assumptions underlying the 
Federal Rules. In Part III of this Article, I join others139 who have argued 
that the decision has changed the law in a way that does not comport with 
these assumptions. 
Both the frame-shift and the judging-as-measuring metaphor that 
support Iqbal’s plausibility analysis are now linguistically and conceptually 
embedded in precedent. Given stare decisis and the generative power of 
conceptual metaphor, they will replicate themselves and spawn related 
tropes in lower court opinions, becoming even further embedded in 21st-
Century pleadings jurisprudence. However, the frames and metaphors of 
Iqbal need not block any reform efforts aimed at the Rules Advisory 
Committee and Congress. Although frames and metaphors have power, 
they do not control us absolutely: “People certainly are affected by 
framing . . . . And metaphors, especially conceptual metaphors, are an 
essential tool of . . . thought itself. But this doesn’t mean that people are 
enslaved by their metaphors . . . . Like other generalizations, metaphors can 
be tested on their predictions and scrutinized on their merits . . . .”140 
Indeed, it is only by actively noticing what metaphors highlight and 
suppress that true critical inquiry of an issue can begin.141 Thus, an 
important first step for reformers, post-Iqbal, is to engage the Rules 
Advisory Committee and Congress in true critical inquiry by explaining 
what the Iqbal decision hides. The Justices were not well-positioned to 
engage in such critical inquiry—an inquiry that should take account of 
recent empirical research regarding discovery costs and that should be 
informed by those with a broad base of experience in federal trial court 
litigation.142  
Thus, it is only by persuading the Rules Advisory Committee to step 
back from the seductive frames and metaphors of Iqbal that reformers may 
inspire a more appropriate inquiry into pleadings jurisprudence to begin—
an  inquiry that could bring federal pleading practice back into line with the 
foundational principles of the Federal Rules.  
                                                                                                                     
 138. See WINTER, supra note 1, at 323 (asserting that in Western societies, law “is synonymous 
with objective delineations of right and wrong”). 
 139. See supra note 70. 
 140. PINKER, supra note 80, at 261. 
 141. See Schön, supra note 121, at 150 (explaining that “critical inquiry” becomes possible 
only when people engage in “awareness and reflection” regarding existing conceptual, or 
generative, metaphors). 
 142. See Burbank, supra note 7, at 116 (critiquing Twombly and Iqbal and noting that the 
policy questions in those cases were not appropriate for judicial determination); Access to Justice 
Denied: Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and 
Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 27 (2009) (statement of Arthur 
Miller, University Professor, New York Univ. School of Law) (“With Twombly and Iqbal, the 
Court may have forsaken [its] commitment [to the rulemaking and legislative processes] by 
reformulating the Rules’ pleading and motion to dismiss standards by judicial fiat.”). 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
After having imposed a plausibility test on pleadings in Twombly, the 
Supreme Court has further increased the requirements for pleadings to state 
a claim in its recent Iqbal decision. This change in pleading standards, 
which affects access to justice in all civil cases, is all the more remarkable 
given the Court’s insistence that it has not changed those standards at all. 
In the text of the majority opinion in Iqbal, frame-shifting and metaphor 
downplay the substantive shift in the law, reinforcing the notion that the 
Court’s analysis is simply a fair and consistent application of precedent, 
rather than a usurpation of the Congressional power to change the Federal 
Rules. 
Specifically, by framing the Rule 12(b)(6) issue in terms of a plaintiff’s 
lack of entitlement to proceed to discovery, the Court de-emphasizes its 
abandonment of fifty years of notice-pleading jurisprudence, which 
emphasized the defendant’s lack of entitlement to detailed allegations at 
the pleading stage. This frame-shift is accompanied by a judging-as-
measuring metaphor that offers reassurance regarding the possibility of 
consistent, objective decisions regarding which plaintiffs are indeed 
entitled to survive early dismissal. Because frame-shifting and metaphor 
both reflect and guide cognitive processes, reformers seeking to reverse 
these recent changes to pleading jurisprudence will succeed only if they 
can enable Congress and the Rules Advisory Committee to step back from 
the frame and metaphor imposed by Iqbal to consider, more fully and 
critically, whether the changes wrought by both Twombly and Iqbal truly 
align with the fundamental principles underlying the Federal Rules. 
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